China and the G8: Problem or Solution?

Pressure is mounting on the G8 to address the question of China’s membership in the Club. The perfect storm of macroeconomic imbalances, soaring energy costs, rising food prices, climate change, global health and international security concerns has brought the issue of enlargement to the center of attention at this year’s G8 Summit. None of these challenges can be fundamentally resolved without China playing an enhanced role in the international system. However, as a guide to action, the debate splits into two camps. One school sees the need to “bring-in” China. The other sees China as part of the problem rather than the solution, either too large to be managed, or too disruptive of the established order.

In the run up to the July 7-9 G8 Summit in Toyako, Japan, the debate is intensifying. The functionalists and students of Great Power politics highlight the need for a new concert of powers. The benefit would be reinvigoration of the legitimacy and efficiency of the G8. China, India and arguably Brazil are the pivots for immediate enlargement.

The resisters are also ramping up their calls for exclusion. The most explicit argument comes from Republican presidential candidate John McCain, who clearly favors keeping the group as a tight league of democracies. The softer side, associated with Japan’s foreign ministry as well as analysts who see the real challenge as the G8 “reaching-in” and consolidating its ranks, talks about the origins and spirit of the Club as a bulwark for the protection of market-based democratic societies in the Cold War context.

We have found in our close investigation of the G8 process – particularly China’s engagements – that either/or interpretations are misleading. The most appropriate term for describing the interaction between the G8 and China is subtle forms of hedging.

The G8 is already pursuing the de facto enlargement question, but its approach at the yearly Summits has been largely incremental and ad hoc, engaging but not formally embracing China. The Club is engaging China along two tracks. The first is the Heiligendamm Process between the G8 and the so-called Outreach 5 (or G5, as they call themselves), initiated by German Chancellor Angela Merkel in 2007. The technical HP discussions aim to build trust and confidence through regularized dialogue on priority issues, ranging from cross border investment, research and innovation, climate change, energy cooperation, and international development. The exercise will be completed at the 2009 G8 summit in Italy. The second track of engagement is host Japan’s climate change discussion at the Toyako summit. While China is participating only as one actor in a group of major economic powers, its impact on climate change exceeds that of merely one among equals.

Less understood is why and how China has hedged its options toward the G8, and emphasized meeting rather than joining. China wants its rise to be peaceful, and to be accepted at the apex of the international order. Beijing wants to see China restored to its so-called ‘rightful place in the world’. But China also wants to enter on its terms. This would mean having a seat at the table and status equivalent to the original seven, which even Russia does not yet have, despite formally joining the Club in 1998. And China would likely join not by itself but with other emerging powers, and avoid being seen as abandoning the global South.

Beijing will likely maintain its hedging behaviour in the near future. However, as China’s international profile grows so does pressure on Beijing to demonstrate that it is willing to act not only as a force for world peace and stability but also a responsible international stakeholder. This makes a turn to G8 membership very possible for China in the medium-term.

The Toyako summit will be an important testing ground for Beijing’s intentions, as well as the G8’s actual capacity to solve problems. Tokyo has focused the Summit discussions on global climate change. Whether we will see a breakthrough on any of the fronts, depends on two things happening. First, that the G8 reaches consensus on how to secure China’s greater participation in the Grouping, including enrolling Beijing in concrete measures on global climate change. Second, that China recognizes that it needs the “G” grouping as much as the G8 needs China, and that its long-term interests lie in working in concert with the “G” members. In this way, China clearly becomes part of the solution.

Tags: China, G8, Hu Jintao, Outreach 5, Yasuo Fukuda